MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR PDF

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The Moon and the Ghetto / icvamlakunsva.ga Tragic Choices / GUIDOCALABRESIand PHIUPBOBBITT. Micromotives and Macrobehavior / THOMASC. Thomas Schelling. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. Norton Chapter 4: " Sorting and Mixing". Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR. SORTING AND MIXING: RACE AND SEX. The similarity ends there, and nobody is about to propose a.


Micromotives And Macrobehavior Pdf

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Schelling, T., Micromotives and macrobehavior pdf - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online. Nonlinear Dynamics between Micromotives and Macrobehavior. Saori Iwanaga & Akira Namatame. Dept. of Computer Science,. National Defense Academy. , Micromotives and Macrobehavior. WW Norton and. Company. Suppose we observe a city with neighborhoods that looks like this. Can.

Purposive Behavior Notice that in all of these hypotheses there is a notion of people's having preferences, pursuing goals, minimizing effort or embarrassment or maximizing view or comfort, seeking company or avoiding it, and otherwise behaving in a way that we might call "purposive. What we typically have is a mode of contingent behaviorbehavior that depends on what others are doing.

Micromotives and Macrobehavior Summary & Study Guide

In other sciences, and sometimes in the social sciences, we metaphorically ascribe motives to behavior because something behaves as if it were oriented toward a goal. Water seeks its own level. Nature abhors a vacuum. Soap bubbles minimize surface tension and light travels a path that, allowing for dif- ferent speeds through different media, minimizes travel time.

But if we fill a J-shaped tube with water and close the lower end so that the water in the pipe cannot achieve its own level, nobody really supposes that the water feels frustrated. Most of us don't think that light is really in a hurry. Lately there are some amongst us who think that sunflowers are anguished if they cannot follow the sun, and we are told that leaves seek positions on trees that divide the sunlight among them to maximize photosynthesis. If we are in the lumber busi- ness we like the leaves to succeed, but not for their sake; we might not even be sure whether the leaves are acting on their own or are merely slaves to an enzyme, or parts of a chemical system for which words like "purpose" and "seek" are wholly nonascriptive and nonevaluative.

But with people it's different. When we analyze how people behave in trying to escape from a burning building we mean that they really are trying to escape. They are not simply acting "as if" they dislike being burnt. With people, in contrast to light beams and water, we usually believe we are dealing with conscious decisions or adaptations in the pursuit of goals, immediate or remote, within the limits of their information and their comprehension of how to navigate through their environ- ment toward whatever their objectives are.

In fact, we can often ascribe to people some capacity to solve problemsto calculate or to perceive intuitively how to get from here to there. And if we know what problem a person is trying to solve, and if we think he actually can solve it, and if we can solve it too, we can anticipate what our subject will do by put- ting ourself in his place and solving his problem as we think he sees it.

This is the method of "vicarious problem solving" that underlies most of microeconomics. An advantage in dealing with "goal-seeking" unconscious substances, like the water that seeks its own level or, in biol- ogy, the genes that seek to protect and proliferate genes like themselves, is that we are not likely to forget that the motives we ascribe are no more than a convenience of expression, a suggestive analogy or a useful formula.

We can forget that people pursue misguided goals or don't know their goals, and that they enjoy or suffer subcon- scious processes that deceive them about their goals. And we can exaggerate how much good is accomplished when people achieve the goals we think they think they have been pursuing. Nevertheless, this style of analysis undeniably invites evalu- ation. It is hard to explore what happens when people behave with a purpose without becoming curious, even concerned, about how well or how badly the outcome serves the purpose.

Social scientists are more like forest rangers than like natural- ists. The naturalist can be interested in what causes a species to become extinct, without caring whether or not it does become extinct. If it has been extinct for a million years his curiosity is surely without concern. The ranger will be con- cerned with whether or not the buffalo do disappear, and how to keep them in a healthy balance with their environment. What makes this evaluation interesting and difficult is that the entire aggregate outcome is what has to be evaluated, not merely how each person does within the constraints of his own environment.

In a burning building it may be wise to run, not walk, to the nearest exit, especially if everybody else is run- ning; what has to be evaluated is how many get safely out of the building if, each doing the best he can to save himself, they all run. Everyone who entered my auditorium may have done a good job of picking the best seat available at the moment he entered the room. Some may have wished, after all eight hundred had taken their seats, that they had sat a little farther front when they saw where everybody else sat and how many others arrived.

But the most interesting ques- tion is not how many people would like to change their seats after they see where everybody else is sitting; it is whether some altogether different seating arrangement might better serve the purposes of many, or most, or all of them.

How well each does for himself in adapting to his social environment is not the same thing as how satisfactory a social environment they collectively create for themselves. In economics the "individuals" are people, families, owners of farms and businesses, taxi drivers, managers of banks and insurance companies, doctors and school teachers and soldiers, and people who work for the banks and the mining companies.

Most people, whether they drive their own taxis or manage continent-wide airlines, are expected to know very little about the whole economy and the way it works.

They know the prices of the things they download and sell, the interest rates at which they lend and borrow, and something about the perti- nent alternatives to the ways they are currently earning their living or running their business or spending their money. The dairy farmer doesn't need to know how many people eat butter and how far away they are, how many other people raise cows, how many babies drink milk, or whether more money is spent on beer than on milk. What he needs to know is the prices of different feeds, the characteristics of different cows, the differ- ent prices fanners are getting for milk according to its butter fat content, the relative costs of hired labor and electrical machinery, and what his net earnings might be if he sold his cows and raised pigs instead or sold his farm and took the best job for which he's qualified in some city he is willing to live in.

Somehow all of the activities seem to get coordinated. There's a taxi to get you to the airport. There's butter and cheese for lunch on the airplane. There are refineries to make the airplane fuel and trucks to transport it, cement for the run- ways, electricity for the escalators, and, most important of all, passengers who want to fly where the airplanes are going.

The fact that there is never a taxi when you need one in the rain, or that you can fly 3, miles more comfortably than you can fly and flights are occasionally overbooked, reminds us how spoiled we are.

Tens of millions of people making billions of decisions every week about what to download and what to sell and where to work and how much to save and how much to borrow and what orders to fill and what stocks to accumulate and where to move and what schools to go to and what jobs to take and where to build the supermarkets and movie theatres and elec- tric power stations, when to invest in buildings above ground and mine shafts underground and fleets of trucks and ships and aircraftif you are in a mood to be amazed, it can amaze you that the system works at all.

Amazement needn't be admi- ration: once you understand the system you may think there are better ones, or better ways to make this system work. I am only inviting you to reflect that whether this system works well or ill, in most countries and especially the countries with com- paratively undirected economic systems, the system works the way ant colonies work.

It is generally not believed that any ant in an ant colony knows how the ant colony works. Each ant has certain things that it does, in coordinated association with other ants, but there is nobody minding the whole store. No ant designed the system. An important part of social biology is relating the world of the individual ant to the world of the ant colony.

The colony is full of patterns and regularities and balanced propor- tions among different activities, with maintenance and repair and exploration and even mobilization for emergencies. But no individual ant knows whether there are too few or too many ants exploring for food or rebuilding after a thunderstorm or helping to carry in the carcass of a beetle. Each ant lives in its own little world, responding to the other ants in its immediate environment and responding to signals of which it does not know the origin.

Why the system works as it does, and as effectively as it does, is a dynamic problem of social and genetic evolution. What I asked you to be amazed at, and not necessarily to admire, is simply the enormous complexity of the entire collec- tive system of behavior, a system that the individuals who comprise the system needn't know anything about or even be aware of.

If we see pattern and order and regularity, we should withhold judgment about whether it is the pattern and order of a jungle, a slave system, or a community infested by parasitic diseases, and inquire first of all what it is that the individuals who comprise the system seem to be doing and how it is that their actions, in the large, produce the patterns we see.

Then we can try to evaluate whether, at least accord- ing to what the individuals are trying to do, the resulting pat- tern is in some way responsive to their intentions.

He discusses so Although this is definitely a classic book, I have to say that I did not enjoy reading it very much. He discusses some issues of real significance, such as residential segregation, but not once does he take his models to the real data.

This book is all about setting up models and seeing what they tell you. I may be somewhat at fault here for reading the book at this time in my life. If I had read it when I was first being exposed to economics, I imagine it would have felt more engaging; as it was, it just felt a little flat. And therefore achieving a big picture policy target is intimately connected by the natural constraints of the problem, or by the actual incentives for people on the ground, or by the way heterogeneity in responses interact as we scale up.

Schelling was a pioneer in the use of game theory to pressing At the core of Schelling's book is the thesis - now well accepted - that individual actions driven by individual incentives have a habit of aggregating into all kinds of interesting macro phenomena.

Schelling was a pioneer in the use of game theory to pressing real life problems he shared a Nobel for it and you see the method being used extensively without any recourse to technical jargon. One of the most compelling arguments of the book is that being a social planner in more practical contexts a leader does not require outright dictatorial control to achieve the solution; rather ensuring coordination between the actors of the system is often more sustainable and efficient think traffic lights.

If we could estimate the size of the crowd and block off the back rows, everybody could indulge his sightseeing and be twelve rows closer to what's going on, and there wouldn't be that embarrassing moat between the speaker and the audience.

Micromotives and Macrobehavior--Thomas C. Schelling.pdf -...

Or if we had people enter from the front instead of the rear, the early arrivals could combine better seats in front with the same opportunity to watch later arrivals come in. Still another hypothesis is that most members of the audi- ence developed their seating habits in other times and places, where they found disadvantages in sitting down front.

Without thinking about it, they sat toward the rear as they always do, later realizing perhaps that there was no teacher to call on stu- dents in the front row and that they could just as well have sat forward and seen and heard better. And so forth.

We could even propose that people are merely tired and take the nearest vacant seat when they enter the room. But that behavior would have to be coupled with a rule of decorumthat the first person in any row must go midway between the two aisles and the next people must move alongside to minimize the climbing overfor this "minimum effort" hypothesis to give us the result we observed.

There is one hypothesis that I find interesting because it is so minimal, yet sufficient. This is that nobody cares where he sits, as long as it's not in the very frontnot in the first occupied row. Out of two dozen rows that might be partially filled, a person is indifferent among 23 of them. He just does not want to sit in the first one.

Actually, everybody may want to sit as far forward as pos- sible, subject to the single proviso that he not be in the first occupied row. Somebody, of course, ends up sitting in front of everybody. And they might all be just as happy, or happier, if the entire audience were shifted 12 rows forward. The people in the other 23 rows surely would prefer to have the whole crowd shifted forward.

An even weaker hypothesis is that people don't even mind being in the very first occupied row as long as the rows imme- diately behind them are filled, so they are not conspicuously down front by themselves. That can lead to the same result. Purposive Behavior Notice that in all of these hypotheses there is a notion of people's having preferences, pursuing goals, minimizing effort or embarrassment or maximizing view or comfort, seeking company or avoiding it, and otherwise behaving in a way that we might call "purposive.

What we typically have is a mode of contingent behaviorbehavior that depends on what others are doing. In other sciences, and sometimes in the social sciences, we metaphorically ascribe motives to behavior because something behaves as if it were oriented toward a goal. Water seeks its own level.

Nature abhors a vacuum. Soap bubbles minimize surface tension and light travels a path that, allowing for dif- ferent speeds through different media, minimizes travel time. But if we fill a J-shaped tube with water and close the lower end so that the water in the pipe cannot achieve its own level, nobody really supposes that the water feels frustrated.

Most of us don't think that light is really in a hurry. Lately there are some amongst us who think that sunflowers are anguished if they cannot follow the sun, and we are told that leaves seek positions on trees that divide the sunlight among them to maximize photosynthesis. If we are in the lumber busi- ness we like the leaves to succeed, but not for their sake; we might not even be sure whether the leaves are acting on their own or are merely slaves to an enzyme, or parts of a chemical system for which words like "purpose" and "seek" are wholly nonascriptive and nonevaluative.

But with people it's different. When we analyze how people behave in trying to escape from a burning building we mean that they really are trying to escape. They are not simply acting "as if" they dislike being burnt. With people, in contrast to light beams and water, we usually believe we are dealing with conscious decisions or adaptations in the pursuit of goals, immediate or remote, within the limits of their information and their comprehension of how to navigate through their environ- ment toward whatever their objectives are.

In fact, we can often ascribe to people some capacity to solve problemsto calculate or to perceive intuitively how to get from here to there. And if we know what problem a person is trying to solve, and if we think he actually can solve it, and if we can solve it too, we can anticipate what our subject will do by put- ting ourself in his place and solving his problem as we think he sees it.

This is the method of "vicarious problem solving" that underlies most of microeconomics. An advantage in dealing with "goal-seeking" unconscious substances, like the water that seeks its own level or, in biol- ogy, the genes that seek to protect and proliferate genes like themselves, is that we are not likely to forget that the motives we ascribe are no more than a convenience of expression, a suggestive analogy or a useful formula.

We can forget that people pursue misguided goals or don't know their goals, and that they enjoy or suffer subcon- scious processes that deceive them about their goals. And we can exaggerate how much good is accomplished when people achieve the goals we think they think they have been pursuing. Nevertheless, this style of analysis undeniably invites evalu- ation. It is hard to explore what happens when people behave with a purpose without becoming curious, even concerned, about how well or how badly the outcome serves the purpose.

Social scientists are more like forest rangers than like natural- ists. The naturalist can be interested in what causes a species to become extinct, without caring whether or not it does become extinct.

Thomas C. Schelling, 1921-2016

If it has been extinct for a million years his curiosity is surely without concern. The ranger will be con- cerned with whether or not the buffalo do disappear, and how to keep them in a healthy balance with their environment. What makes this evaluation interesting and difficult is that the entire aggregate outcome is what has to be evaluated, not merely how each person does within the constraints of his own environment. In a burning building it may be wise to run, not walk, to the nearest exit, especially if everybody else is run- ning; what has to be evaluated is how many get safely out of the building if, each doing the best he can to save himself, they all run.

Schelling, T., Micromotives and macrobehavior 1978.pdf

Everyone who entered my auditorium may have done a good job of picking the best seat available at the moment he entered the room. Some may have wished, after all eight hundred had taken their seats, that they had sat a little farther front when they saw where everybody else sat and how many others arrived.

But the most interesting ques- tion is not how many people would like to change their seats after they see where everybody else is sitting; it is whether some altogether different seating arrangement might better serve the purposes of many, or most, or all of them. How well each does for himself in adapting to his social environment is not the same thing as how satisfactory a social environment they collectively create for themselves.

In economics the "individuals" are people, families, owners of farms and businesses, taxi drivers, managers of banks and insurance companies, doctors and school teachers and soldiers, and people who work for the banks and the mining companies.

Most people, whether they drive their own taxis or manage continent-wide airlines, are expected to know very little about the whole economy and the way it works. They know the prices of the things they download and sell, the interest rates at which they lend and borrow, and something about the perti- nent alternatives to the ways they are currently earning their living or running their business or spending their money.

The dairy farmer doesn't need to know how many people eat butter and how far away they are, how many other people raise cows, how many babies drink milk, or whether more money is spent on beer than on milk. What he needs to know is the prices of different feeds, the characteristics of different cows, the differ- ent prices fanners are getting for milk according to its butter fat content, the relative costs of hired labor and electrical machinery, and what his net earnings might be if he sold his cows and raised pigs instead or sold his farm and took the best job for which he's qualified in some city he is willing to live in.

Somehow all of the activities seem to get coordinated.

There's a taxi to get you to the airport.Littauer Professor of Political Economy. With the river flowing two miles per hour.

The differ- ence is that in the one case the two sides of the equation. What makes this evaluation interesting and difficult is that the entire aggregate outcome is what has to be evaluated, not merely how each person does within the constraints of his own environment.

There is no single mode of behavior that covers all these cases. It is sometimes implied that any proposition that is true by definition—inherently true irrespective of what the facts may be. Outdoor temperature. But even inconclusive analysis can warn against jumping to conclusions about individual intentions from observations of aggregates. Water seeks its own level. The earliest arrivals get to sit far- thest to the rear.

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